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ABSTRACT 
 
Bayesian probability problems are notoriously difficult for people to solve 
accurately. Base rate neglect refers to the hypothesis that people ignore base 
rate information in preference for individuating information when making these 
probability judgments (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Correct answers to base 
rate neglect problems often require complex Bayesian calculations involving 
probability information embedded within realistic event descriptions. The past 
research emphasis on base rate neglect responses for such problems has 
overlooked the fact that responses can actually vary widely across participants 
and within participants from one problem to the next. The verbal protocol 
analyses of participants’ decision making processes found in the current study 
revealed that participants use a variety of cognitive strategies to solve such 
problems. The between-participant and within-participant variability can result 
from simple miscalculations to difficulties with translating probability 
statements into numerical calculations. This translation process can be further 
complicated by idiosyncratic subjective interpretations of the event 
descriptions and a basic misunderstanding of objective probability information. 
The results of the current study highlight that improving an individual’s 
Bayesian reasoning requires the instructional procedure to be tailored to their 
sources of difficulties, and that individual protocol analyses could help define 
these instructional procedures. 
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                                                         1 
Bayesian mind: Making sense of probability-based decision making strategies 
In 1956, Herbert Simon challenged the traditional view of rational decision 
making which assumed that decision makers have access to the complete information and 
can recognize consequences of each alternative course of action, as well as, choose to 
maximize utility or gain. Simon proposed an alternative “bounded rationality” view that 
described human beings with limited time, knowledge, and computational capabilities to 
make complex decisions. Simon viewed human decision makers as seeking satisfactory 
decisions rather than optimal ones. As a result, Simon’s theoretical and research approach 
focused on the cognitive processes by which people actually make their decisions. This 
approach was to dominate decision making research for the next 60 years and is integral 
to the present thesis.  
Bayesian Reasoning and Base Rate Neglect 
Around the same time as Simon was establishing his research program on general 
decision making and problem solving, Meehl and Rosen (1955) had come to a similar 
conclusion, and reported that clinical psychologists tended to make clinical predictions 
based on subjective intuitions rather than mathematical-supported data. Meehl and Rosen 
emphasized the importance of base rate data for evaluating the accuracy of psychometric 
devices, but also noted, that unfortunately base rate information was rarely reported in the 
literature. Meehl and Rosen made the strong argument that a lack of ability to figure out 
base rates is the main reason for people disregarding them, and consequently, they urged 
researchers to collect base rate information, as well as, false negative and false positive 
rates for psychological tests. They believed that decisions based on this additional 
objective information would lead to improved clinical decision making. They also 
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highlighted the use of Bayesian probability formulae to calculate correct judgments based 
on these data. Their approach highlighted a prescriptive approach for overcoming the 
bounded rationality inherent to human decision making. Unfortunately, this long standing 
prescription is still ignored by most people as they rely heavily on their own intuitive 
decision making skills for the most part, do not involve objective sources of data or 
mathematical calculations. 
Many real-world decisions involve evidence-based judgments regarding the 
predicted likelihood of an event after incorporating new evidence (e.g., Bayes’ Theorem). 
The mathematical presentation of Bayes’ Theorem is as follows: 
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵)  =  
𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) × 𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐵|¬𝐴) ×𝑃(¬𝐴)+𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) ×𝑃(𝐴)
.                                                                (1) 
P(A) and P(A) refer to the base rate probabilities of event A occurring (e.g., 
have cancer) and event A not occurring (e.g., don’t have cancer). P(B|A) is the 
conditional probability of a related event B (e.g., positive mammogram test result) 
occurring when event A is true (e.g., person has cancer), whereas P(B|A) is the 
conditional probability of event B (e.g., positive mammogram test result) occurring when 
event A is not true (e.g., person does not have cancer). These values provide new 
evidence regarding the likelihood of event A occurring. Finally, P(A|B) is the updated 
probability of event A occurring (e.g., person has cancer) if event B is true (e.g., positive 
mammogram test result). This value results from the combined sources of base rate 
information and individuating test information. Unfortunately, when people are faced 
with these decisions in daily life they rarely follow these normative steps for making their 
final judgments (Azjen, 1977; Bar-Hillel, 1980; Edwards, 1968; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 
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1995; Hammerton, 1973; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007; 
Lyon & Slovic; 1976; McNair & Feeney, 2014; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). 
Edwards (1968) was the first to report that people do not make correct Bayesian 
decisions, and that they act very conservatively when adjusting their prior belief (base 
rate) after given new evidence. Edwards tested this claim by giving his participants the 
following Bayesian reasoning problem: “There are two book bags, one containing 700 
red and 300 blue chips, the other containing 300 red and 700 blue. Take one of the bags. 
Now, you sample, randomly, with replacement after each chip. In 12 samples, you get 8 
reds and 4 blues. What is the probability that this is the predominantly red bag?” The 
correct Bayesian answer is 0.97, but most of Edward’s participants chose 0.70 as their 
answer. This conservatism correction highlighted the difficulties people have solving 
Bayesian reasoning problems. 
But it was the very influential series of papers by Kahneman and Tversky in the 
1970s that not only expanded on Simon’s bounded rationality work but also further 
highlighted the importance of examining how people really make their decisions. They 
proposed that people used cognitive “heuristics” to make satisfactory judgments that 
overcame their limited cognitive capacity for fully processing the complex amounts of 
decision information inherent to many real world decisions. They argued that intuitive 
judgment processes are not quantitatively simpler than normative models, but rather that 
they fall into a different qualitative category of processing. They also speculated that a 
heuristic approach to making decisions would also lead to predictable biases in the final 
decisions. This early work of Kahneman and Tversky focused on three general heuristics: 
(1) availability, (2) representativeness, and (3) adjustment and anchoring. 
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The representative heuristic was proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1972) to 
explain why base rate information was often neglected when making decisions (base rate 
neglect). Their initial definition of the representative heuristic was that people assess 
probability information for an uncertain event by “the degree to which an event is similar 
in essential characteristics to its parent population and reflects the salient features of the 
process by which that probability information is generated” (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1972, p. 431). Kahneman and Tversky (1973) illustrated the use of this heuristic with a 
decision problem that is now referred to as the ‘Engineer and Lawyer Problem’. They 
gave their participants a brief personality descriptions of several individuals who were 
randomly drawn from either a group made up of 70 engineers and 30 lawyers or a group 
made up of 30 engineers and 70 lawyers. Participants were required to determine the 
probability for each description that it belonged to an engineer rather than to a lawyer. 
For example, “Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four children. He is 
generally conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows no interest in political and 
social issues and spends most of his free time on his many hobbies which include home 
carpentry, sailing, and mathematical puzzles. What is the probability that Jack is one of 
the 30 engineers in the sample?” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973, p. 241). Kahneman and 
Tversky found that participants gave the same probability judgments for both group 
conditions, and that a specific description of an engineer lead participants to ignore prior 
probabilities (i.e., base rate information). In fact, participants even ignored prior 
probabilities when they were given specific but irrelevant evidence (e.g., marital status 
and reputation at work). However, when participants were not presented with the specific 
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personality descriptions, participants correctly used the prior probabilities (i.e. base rates) 
to make their judgments.  
Tversky and Kahneman (1982) also presented participants with a more complex 
Bayesian problem that described a common real world problem where prior evidence 
(e.g., base rate information) is updated with new evidence (e.g., individuating 
information) to provide an accurate probability judgment of an outcome. In their study, 
participants were given the following scenario to read (now known as the ‘Taxi Cab 
Problem’): “A cab was involved in a hit and run accident at night. Two cab companies, 
the Green and the Blue, operate in the city. 85% of the cabs in the city are Green and 
15% are Blue. A witness identified the cab as Blue. The court tested the reliability of the 
witness under the same circumstances that existed on the night of the accident and 
concluded that the witness correctly identified each one of the two colors 80% of the time 
and failed 20% of the time. What is the probability that the cab involved in the accident 
was Blue rather than Green knowing that this witness identified it as Blue?” (p. 156-157). 
Tversky and Kahneman (1982) reported that the modal answer obtained from participants 
was 80% for the Taxi Cab problem, and this result again highlighted the common 
practice of neglecting base rate information. Other researchers quickly replicated this 
finding (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Lyon & Slovic, 1976), and Bar-Hillel (1980) even suggested 
that base rate neglect should be considered a “matter of established fact” (Bar-Hillel, 
1980, p. 215). However, Bar-Hillel also noted that the representative heuristic 
explanation Kahneman and Tversky provided for their Engineer and Lawyer problem did 
not apply as well to the more complex Taxi Cab problem.  
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Consequently, Tversky and Kahneman (1977, 1980) proposed an alternative 
causal schema explanation for the neglect of base rate information with the taxi cab 
problem, which has its origins in the causal interpretations proposed by Ajzen (1977). 
Ajzen argued that people look for causal links for events or behaviors, and therefore 
participants’ predictions will be influenced by whether the given information suggest 
casual factors or not. He proposed that even statistically relevant normative information 
will be neglected if it is not causally significant, and that this information is mainly used 
when no causal model can be represented. Ajzen explained the engineer and lawyer 
problem findings as resulting from a population base rate for each occupation that did not 
cause any member of the sample to be related to either job whereas the specific 
descriptions (e.g., traits, ability, and others) of the individuals did provide casually 
significant information. 
In response to Ajzen’s argument regarding the causal relevance of the information 
provided in such problems, Tversky and Kahneman (1977) revised the role of the 
representative heuristic to be overridden by a casual interpretation, if such an 
interpretation was readily available. For example, when Tversky and Kahneman (1977) 
changed the base rate information for the Taxi Cab problem to now describe the 
frequency of previous accidents “Although the two companies are roughly equal in size, 
85% of cab accidents in the city involve Green cabs, and 15% involve Blue cabs” (p. 31), 
the proportion of base rate neglect answers was significantly decreased. They also found 
such causal details were directional in that this information was more influential than 
diagnostic data, and that causal details were also specific in their influence and only 
considered when they fit the causal schema. 
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More recently, Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007) found further support for a causal 
explanation for base rate neglect in Bayesian reasoning. They argued that people make 
use of valuable causal knowledge to make accurate judgments in daily life, and that it is 
hard to highlight this in traditional laboratory experiments. They often observed base rate 
information was neglected by participants when given a typical Bayesian problem (e.g., 
mammogram test that detects breast cancers), but when they provided a reason for why 
this test might produce an erroneous false positive result (e.g., due to harmless benign 
cyst), the proportion of base rate neglect answers decreased sharply. They suggested that 
the addition of this information helped people to set up a causal model to assign 
appropriate values for making correct Bayesian judgments. 
In fact, Hammerton (1973) had already proposed a similar experiential-based 
explanation for the general neglect of probability information by participants when given 
such problems to solve. Hammerton presented the following Bayesian problem to his 
participants: 
1. A device has been invented for screening a population for a disease known as 
psylicrapitis.  
2. The device is a very good one, but not perfect.  
3. If someone is a sufferer, there is a 90% chance that he will be recorded 
positively. 
4. If he is not a sufferer, there is still a 1% chance that he will be recorded 
 positively. 
5. Roughly 1% of the population has the disease. 
6. Mr. Smith has been tested and the result is positive. (p. 252). 
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His participants consistently estimated a much higher probability than the actual answer 
of around 48%. Changing the order in which the information was presented and taking 
out some of the probability information did not remove this response bias. However, 
when Hammerton changed the description of the problem to a mechanical device which 
screens engine parts for internal cracks, his participants now estimated much lower 
probabilities (65%). Hammerton believed that participants had rigid prior expectations 
regarding the infallibility of medical diagnostic tests, and that their previous experiences 
could influence the degree to which case-specific information could affect their 
probability judgments. Hammerton’s explanation for base rate neglect is not based on a 
lacking or faulty causal schema as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky, but rather the 
influence of personal experiences and beliefs for subjectively accepting or rejecting 
objective sources of probability information.  
However, the prior expectations explanation proposed by Hammerton was 
criticized by Lyon and Slovic (1976) because there are surely no rigid prior evidence 
from a typical participant’s experiences about witness identification infallibility that 
would be expected for the classic Taxicab problem. Lyon and Slovic (1976) compared 
the Taxicab problem with a similar structure involving a different context (a machine to 
detect light bulb failure). They did not find a problem context effect, but support from a 
null hypothesis prediction is hardly a strong case for rejecting Hammerton’s explanation. 
However, as the current thesis will highlight, making broad theoretical conclusions based 
on the answers alone provided by participants in these kind of tasks is also fraught with 
possible confounds. The current thesis will highlight the theoretical benefit of allowing 
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multiple explanations to play a role in accounting for the variety of responses possible for 
complex Bayesian decision problems. 
Bar-Hillel (1980) pointed out that the causality argument is an incomplete 
explanation, because the causality argument accounts for when base rates will be ignored 
but not why base rates will be ignored. She argued that the relevance of the base rate 
information determines whether people would use this information, and that causal 
relevance was a special case of relevance. Bar-Hillel proposed that relevance is the main 
factor why people ignore base rate information, because they view base rate information 
as irrelevant. She conducted a number of experiments using multiple Bayesian problems 
in different contexts (e.g., Taxicab accident, suicide, and dreaming), and she found that 
participants only integrated the two sources of information (base rate and individuating) 
when both sources of information are equally relevant. She also suggested that providing 
participants with multiple Bayesian problems will help highlight the relevance of both 
sources of information. This notion of relevance was never clearly defined by Bar-Hillel, 
but it does seem to relate to both prior expectations and causal schemas. However, as you 
will see later when the current study examines within-participant variability in Bayesian 
reasoning responses, relevance of the two sources of information does not appear to occur 
naturally with practice. 
The previous research suggests that emphasizing the relevance (especially causal 
relevance) of the two sources of information when solving Bayesian reasoning problems 
will overcome the base rate neglect bias. However Gigerenzer and colleagues suggest 
that additional cognitive difficulties still need to be overcome when making these 
decisions. They argue that the main reason why Bayesian reasoning is so difficult for 
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human participants to perform is because the human mind was not designed to process 
information in a probability format (Gigerenzer, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). 
Gigerenzer (1996) suggested that natural frequencies are easier to process because of our 
evolutionary history for dealing with naturally occurring frequency data. Gigerenzer also 
argued that presenting information in natural frequencies gives people more information 
about the size of a certain reference class, and therefore, helps participants make 
inferences that more closely resemble the normative Bayesian approach.   
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) gave their participants multiple Bayesian 
problems to solve that were presented in either frequency or standard probability formats. 
The following Bayesian problem highlights how frequency information differs from 
probability information: “10 out of every 1,000 women at age forty who participate in 
routine screening have breast cancer. 8 of every 10 women with breast cancer will get a 
positive mammography. 95 out of every 990 women without breast cancer will also get a 
positive mammography. Here is a new representative sample of women at age forty who 
received a positive mammography in routine screening. How many of these women do 
you expect to actually have breast cancer? ___ out of ___.” (p. 688). They found that the 
number of participants who gave correct (or close to correct) Bayesian answers was 16% 
for problems presented to participants using the probability format, whereas 46% of the 
participants provided correct answers to problems presented using a natural frequency 
format. This is a substantial improvement in Bayesian reasoning, but we should highlight 
that even after this change in format, over 50% of these Bayesian problems are still being 
calculated incorrectly. Again highlighting that more than one explanation is needed to 
account for the variability in participants’ responses with Bayesian reasoning tasks. 
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Lewis and Keren (1999) also pointed out that the frequency argument posed by 
Gigerenzer has a major confound when comparing probability and frequency formats; the 
use of joint versus conditional data presentation in given sampling information. They 
argued data presented in frequency format (e.g., 10 out of every 1000 women have 
cancer, 8 of every 10 women with cancer get positive test results, and 95 out of every 990 
women without cancer get positive test results) was much easier to comprehend and 
compute as it described events as jointly occurring, whereas conditional statements were 
used to describing problems in probability format (e.g., 10 out of 1000 women have 
cancer, 800 out of 1000 women with cancer get positive test results, and 96 out of 1000 
women without cancer get positive test results). 
Ayal and Beyth-Maron (2014) suggested that the main difference between these 
arguments derived from the different number of mental steps individuals needed to 
compute in each case. They manipulated the number of computations needed to solve a 
typical Bayesian problem (1 to 4) and the type of data presentation used for each problem 
(frequency versus probability). For example, some participants only needed to calculate 
the final computation in the Bayesian calculations whereas other participants needed to 
calculate three additional earlier computations in the sequence of Bayesian calculations. 
When participants only needed one calculation, the correct answer was provided 55.2% 
of the time when the problem’s information was presented in a frequency format, 
whereas only 32.3% of the problems were calculated successfully when the probability 
format was given. This finding supports Gigerenzer’s natural frequencies argument. 
However, this advantage in performance was diminished with each additional mental 
computation required. When participants needed to correctly make four computations, the 
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difference in the success rate between the two formats was less than 4% (10% for 
frequency format vs. 13.8% for probability format). These findings are a problem for 
Gigerenzer’s frequency explanation because this proposition assumes that the frequency 
advantage should be greater when more computations are required, but this was not found 
to be the case. These results suggest that there are more challenges for participants when 
performing these computations than just the format of the data representation.  
One Explanation or Many 
When Bar-Hillel (1980) replicated the classic ‘Taxicab’ problem, she found that 
only about 10% of her participants gave the normative Bayesian probability answer while 
another 36% of participants ignored base rate information (i.e., base rate neglect). The 
other 54% of her participants made non-normative answers which could not be explained 
by base rate neglect. Many participants gave judgments that defied any clear logical or 
mathematical computations. This wide range of non-normative judgments even results 
for highly educated individuals and individuals with strong numeracy skills (Lipkus, 
Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; McNair & Feeney, 2014), and is typical for all previous research 
involving Bayesian reasoning (refer to Figure 1 for additional examples). But past 
research on Bayesian reasoning has typically focused on a single explanation for the non-
normative judgments made by participants, and researchers have ignored other non-
explained responses, even when these responses constituted the majority of cases. This 
point is further illustrated by the attempts of researchers to improve Bayesian reasoning, 
such as by providing causal information (Kahneman & Tversky, 1980; Krynski and 
Tenenbaum, 2007) or by providing information in a frequency format (Gigerenzer & 
Hoffrage, 1995). Although these attempts have been successful at improving the success 
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rates for Bayesian calculations, the majority of participants in these studies still do not 
show any benefits from these experimental manipulations. Research is needed that does a 
better job of describing the many different ways that participants approach Bayesian 
reasoning problems, and with this knowledge, researchers will be better able to target 
specific interventions to combat biases that result from these differences. 
After synthesizing the results from previous research on Bayesian reasoning, it is 
evident that the range of responses that result reflect the interaction between an 
individual’s subjective, intuitive reasoning and the individual’s ability to perform the 
necessary computations.  Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) alluded to this interaction 
when they stated that “Maybe the mind does a little of both Bayesian computation and 
quick-and-dirty inference.” (p. 685). Unfortunately, they also concluded that 
incorporating both perspectives would make very little theoretical progress because they 
believed this would just compromise or weaken the two different viewpoints. Gigerenzer 
and Hoffrage also argued those viewpoints were incomplete because they focused on 
cognitive processes not cognitive algorithm (frequency or probability) and information 
format. The findings of the current study will reveal that incorporating both perspectives 
is actually the best way forward for understanding the theoretical underpinnings of 
Bayesian reasoning, as well as prescribing methods for improving Bayesian reasoning 
skills in the general population. 
Between-participant and Within-participant Variability 
 The literature review presented so far highlights the considerable variability in 
judgments made by participants when given a single Bayesian decision problem 
(between-participant variability). However, this is not the only source of variability when 
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examining Bayesian reasoning. When participants are given multiple Bayesian problems 
there is also evidence of within-participant variability in their responses. 
Byun and Ball (2015) presented 110 participants with nine Bayesian reasoning 
problems to solve. Each Bayesian problem described different real world events that a 
person could experience, but the probability information provided for each problem was 
designed to be numerically quite similar. As expected from previous research with such 
problems, a wide range of answers were provided for each and every problem (between-
participant variability). The wide distribution in responses are highlighted for a sample of 
problems in Figure 2. In addition, Byun and Ball found that the overall distribution of 
responses could differ from one problem to the next even though the probability 
information was very similar in each case. This finding suggested that perhaps there was 
some degree of within-participant variability in the responses provided by the same 
participant to different Bayesian problems. 
To highlight this within-participant variability in responses, Byun and Ball (2015) 
mathematically calculated measures of response inconsistency across the nine Bayesian 
problems using known response types for comparisons (e.g., correct answer, base rate 
neglect answer). They found that some participants use a consistent probability based 
strategy (i.e., very low response inconsistency) even if their answers were generally 
incorrect. Other participants provided such large response inconsistency scores that a 
common probability-based strategy was unlikely to have been used by these participants 
(refer to Figure 3). In fact, more than half of the participants showed these inconsistent 
response patterns, suggesting that within-participant variability can also account for the 
wide range of answers typically found with Bayesian reasoning tasks. Unfortunately, it is 
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very difficult to determine a participant’s specific judgment strategy when researchers 
only have the participants’ answers to determine these strategies. 
One possible explanation for these two sources of variability could still be that the 
mathematical computations undertaken by the participants are so incorrect that they could 
produce substantial variability in responses (even across problems). To test this 
explanation, Byun and Ball (2015) also provided their participants with the classic 
Taxicab problem and asked their participants to specifically calculate each computational 
step of this Bayesian problem by isolating each verbal description for that probability 
calculation. The percentage of correct answers decreased as participants moved from one 
computation to the next, and the number of answers given by participants for each 
computation quickly multiplied (refer to Table 1). These results suggest that many 
participants have considerable trouble translating verbal probability descriptions into 
numerical calculations, and that early miscalculations could combine to compound the 
variability in the final answers obtained. If this is the case, however, one would expect 
that the participant’s numeracy ability (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Lipkus & Peters, 
2009) or cognitive reasoning ability (Frederick, 2005) would successfully predict each 
participant’s ability to successfully complete each computational step. 
The Numeracy scale was developed by Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer (2001) to 
measure the numerical capabilities necessary for performing the mathematical operations 
inherent to probability calculations. The three item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) was 
developed by Frederick (2005) to assess the ability of an individual to suppress an 
intuitive, heuristic (but wrong) response in favor of a reflective, analytical (correct) 
response. Researchers have found the CRT to correlate with an individual's’ knowledge 
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of statistical concepts (Obrecht, Chapman, & Gelman, 2007) and tendency to produced 
biased responses, such as the gambler’s fallacy and outcome bias (Toplak, West, & 
Stanovich, 2011).   
Byun and Ball (2015) incorporated the Numeracy scale and a two-item version of 
the CRT in their study. They found significant correlations for these measures with the 
performance of participants on the early computation steps of the Taxi Cab problem 
(refer to Table 1). However, as the computation steps became more complex, these 
correlations became smaller and non-significant predictors of computational success 
(refer to Table 1). These findings highlight that computational calculations (or more 
appropriately – miscalculations) do play a role in explaining the variability of participant 
responses, but these findings also suggest that other factors could play a role in the 
unaccounted response variability. 
Verbal Protocol Analysis 
The goal of the current study was to fully explain the sources of variability in 
Bayesian reasoning that is evident in typical base rate neglect problems. Previous 
explanations are based solely on the answers provided by participants to usually one 
Bayesian problem. However, there are different ways of coming up with the same 
incorrect answers, and these answers cannot clearly depict a misstep or miscalculation in 
the computation process. Our goal was to examine the thought processes that participant 
followed when attempting to solve complex Bayesian decision problems. Verbal or think-
aloud protocols have been used successfully in the past to examine the cognitive 
processes and strategies used by participants when making decisions (e.g., Ball, 
Langholtz, Auble, & Sopchak, 1998). The verbal protocol procedure requires the 
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participant to speak out aloud their thought processes as they make their decisions or 
solve problems (concurrent verbal protocol), or speak out aloud their thought processes 
after they have provided their decision or answer (retrospective verbal protocol). 
However, researchers have raised concerns that the verbal protocol methodology could 
affect the thought processes of the participant or inadequately elicit all of the thoughts 
that went into making a decision or solving a problem (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
Regardless of these concerns, the verbal protocol procedure still allowed us to conduct 
the first detailed analysis of the cognitive processes involved in Bayesian reasoning. 
Consequently, a much richer source of individual data will be provided in this study than 
has been achieved in past research that has relied on the participant’s final answers as the 
sole source of their research conclusions. 
Pilot research was conducted to establish the best verbal protocol procedure when 
examining Bayesian reasoning. The concurrent verbal protocol procedure was rejected by 
the experimenters because it interfered too much when solving these complex, 
information laden problems. The retrospective protocol procedure did not interfere with 
the thought processes needed to solve such problems, and also provided good data when 
the protocol was undertaken as soon as possible after the participant provided their 
answer. We also found that additional verbal prompts provided by the experimenter after 
the retrospective protocol data was collected, could also help pinpoint the use or non-use 
of probability information when solving each problem. We hypothesized that the 
strategies participants use to solve Bayesian reasoning problems will vary in the type of 
(probability and story) information they use and how they use this information. 
Furthermore, we speculated that the reasons for these differences (between-participant 
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and within-participant) will be a function of their subjective interpretation of the 
Bayesian problem’s story context and their ability to perform the necessary mathematical 
computations. Participants will vary in the relative influence of these factors, and we 
hope to document where these factors will influence the reasoning processes during each 
participant’s computations. 
Method 
 Participants 
Thirty-four undergraduate students (17 male and 17 female) at the College of 
William & Mary participated in this experiment for course credit. We omitted data from 
three participants who were not native English speakers. The final sample of 31 
participants consisted of 15 men and 16 women with a mean age of 18.61 years (SD = 
1.02). 
Apparatus 
 The experimenter sat in front of a computer and controlled the experiment using 
Microsoft PowerPoint. Participants sat in front of a second monitor connected to the                                          
experimenter’s computer. A standing screen separated the experimenter from the 
participant so no visual contact between the two people was possible. A microphone was 
placed next to the monitor and in front of the participant, and the participant’s verbal 
responses were recorded using the Audacity software. Participants were provided with a 
pen and scratch paper if they needed to write down any calculations.  
Procedure 
After the participant provided Informed Consent, the think-aloud Bayesian 
reasoning task was presented by the computer to each participant. The computer 
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presented the instructions for performing the task: “In this experiment, you are going to 
read three scenarios that describe real world decisions people are faced with making. 
Many decisions like these, require us to incorporate probability information in our 
decision making. Please treat each decision as seriously as you would if each decision 
scenario applied to you or a close family member or friend.” 
Participants were asked to solve three Bayesian reasoning problems which were 
adapted from the problems used by McNair and Feeney (2014). The problem descriptions 
were edited by the author to make them more realistic to the participants and appear less 
like mathematical problems. The descriptions and images presented for each problem are 
displayed in Figure 4. 
 After the participant gave their answer to each of the three problems, the 
following retrospective verbal protocol instructions were provided: “Now we would like 
you to go back through each decision problem and explain your thought processes in 
coming up with each answer. Please tell the experimenter in as much as detail as 
possible the thoughts that came to mind during this decision making process, no matter 
how relevant or important they may sound to you now. Please tell us what you were 
thinking about when you read the specific items of information (numerical and non-
numerical) that make up each decision problem. Please explain the thoughts that went 
into interpreting each problem and how you used the probability information provided to 
solve the problem. Please try to provide as much detail as you can regarding the thinking 
you followed from the start to the end of the mental decision making steps you 
undertook.” To facilitate this recall, the participant was presented with the same problem 
descriptions again (refer to Figure 4) with an additional instruction displayed at the 
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bottom of each problem: “Please describe all of your thought processes.” If the 
participant did not say anything about their use or non-use of the specific probability 
information provided for each problem, the experimenter prompted them with specific 
questions about whether they had used that information and why they did or did not use 
this information. After the participant provided their verbal protocol for each problem, 
the experimenter asked the participant to rate the credibility of the probability 
information provided for each problem (0 = not credible to 7 = very credible) and to rate 
how realistic they found the description of the situation (0 = not realistic to 7 = very 
realistic). The order of the three Bayesian problems was counterbalanced across the 
participants. The experiment took approximately 30 minutes to complete.  
Data Coding 
 The recorded verbal descriptions (including answers to prompts) provided by the 
participants were then transcribed. The transcriptions were segmented to highlight 
statements that related to the thought processes involved in making their judgments. 
These statements were coded for content that related to subjective interpretations of the 
information provided and for content that related to objective use of the probability 
information provided. An example of a segmented transcript from a participant and the 
coding that resulted for this transcript is provided in Figure 5. The reliability of the 
content analysis was tested by using two coders to code the same random sample of 
transcripts, and the inter-coder agreement approached 100% agreement. 
Results 
Answers 
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 The current study provided a similar patterns of responses as reported previously 
by Byun and Ball (2015) when giving participants multiple Bayesian probability 
problems to answer (refer to Figure 6). The large number of answers and the wide range 
of values provided for the Pregnancy Test problem (number of answers = 15; range of 
answers = .16 – 90%), the Sniffer Dog problem (number of answers = 16; range of 
answers = 1.4 – 90%), and the Spam E-mail problem (number of answers = 20; range of 
answers = .08 – 100%) are consistent with the findings of Byun and Ball (2015). The 
base rate neglect answer for each problem was not the modal answer provided by 
participants as is often found in previous research (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Byun & Ball, 2015; 
Cohen & Staub, 2015; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007; McNair & Feeney, 2014, 2015). 
Realism and Credibility of Problem Descriptions 
The realism ratings of the event descriptions for the Pregnancy Test problem (M = 
5.00, SD = 1.77), Sniffer Dog problem (M = 4.97, SD = 1.78), and Spam E-mail problem 
(M = 4.52, SD = 1.63) were all above the mid-point for this scale (3.5), suggesting that 
the majority of the participants believed these events were similar to those experienced in 
real life. In addition, the participants’ ratings of the credibility of the probability 
information provided for the Pregnancy Test problem (M = 5.34, SD = 1.70), the Spam E-
mail problem (M = 5.06, SD = 1.32), and the Sniffer Dog problem (M = 4.39, SD = 1.50) 
were also above the mid-point for this scale (3.5), suggesting that most participants also 
found the probability values to be consistent with what they would expect for real-life 
events of these types.  
Correct Bayesian Reasoning 
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 Two participants (6%) used the correct Bayesian reasoning steps to calculate all 
three of their answers. These participants did not provide subjective interpretations of 
event information, and provided the necessary probability calculations given by Bayes 
Theorem (refer to Figure 7). One participant used the standard probability format in 
making these calculations while the other participant converted the probability values to 
frequencies before performing their calculations.  
There were two other participants who used correct Bayesian calculations for one 
problem but not for the other two problems. One of these participants was particularly 
interesting, because his data highlights the within-participant variability issues that can 
result with complex real-world decision making problems like those used in the current 
study. This participant used a very simple intuition-based reasoning approach to give 
non-normative answers for the first two problems, but then changed his strategy for the 
final problem and used the correct Bayesian calculations for this problem. This 
participant clearly had the mathematical knowledge to utilize the normative Bayesian 
reasoning procedure, but chose not to do so for the first two problems.  
In total, only eight (9%) out of the 93 total problems completed by all participants 
were correctly solved by the participants in this study. This result again highlights the 
need for a better understanding of the many possible reasons people are not using the 
normative Bayesian computations when making these types of decisions. 
Incorrect Probability-based Reasoning – Missing or Miscalculated Step(s) 
 The next group of participants can be categorized into two distinctive sub-groups 
who made use of some or all of the probability information provided for each problem, 
but then made errors in how they used this information. In the first sub-group, six 
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participants (19%) incorporated all of the probability information provided in one or 
more of the problems, but they combined this information incorrectly when calculating 
their final answers (refer to Figure 8). Some examples of miscalculations used by these 
participants are: using (P(H) + P(¬H))P(D|H) instead of P(¬H)P(D|H), and using 
(P(H)P(H|D)) / (P(¬H)P(H|¬D)) instead of (P(H)P(H|D)) / (P(H)P(H|D) + 
P(¬H)P(H|¬D)). 
The other group of three participants (10%) correctly calculated P(¬H), 
P(H)P(D|H), and P(¬H)P(D|¬H) in at least one of the problems, but they then selected 
one of the conditional probability values as their final answer (refer to Figure 9). These 
participants often had a problem seeing that four outcomes are possible when combining 
two events (e.g., event 1 = drugs in suitcase and event 2 = dog detects drugs) and involve 
‘hits’ (e.g., correct detection of drugs in suitcase), ‘false positives’ (e.g., incorrect 
detection of drugs in suitcase), ‘misses’ (e.g., missed detection of drugs in suitcase), and 
‘correct rejections’ (e.g., did not detect drugs in suitcase when they were not present). 
These participants incorrectly perceived that there were only two outcomes for 
combinations of two events (e.g., drugs were present or drugs were not present), and the 
two outcomes they chose related to the event they perceived as more important to the 
question. 
Incorrect Probability-based Reasoning – Failure to Utilize All Information 
This group of participants attempted to use some of the probability information to 
calculate their answers, but they did not use all of the probability information necessary 
to do so correctly (refer to Figure 10). Some stopped too early in their calculations (e.g., 
P(H)P(D|H)) and/or combined probability information in incorrect ways (e.g., 
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P(H)P(¬H), (P(D|H) – P(D|H)P(D|¬H))). Some of these participants even failed to 
calculate P(¬H), that is a vital early step in the correct sequence of Bayesian 
computations. Eight participants (26%) solved one or more of the problems in this way. 
Intuition-based Reasoning Combined with Probability-based Reasoning 
 Participants in this group only utilized one or two pieces of probability 
information as simple guides for making their intuitive judgments. They often incorrectly 
rejected sources of probability information as irrelevant (e.g., ‘it involved other people’, 
‘it was what happened in the past’, ‘the accuracy of dogs is not relevant’, ‘because they 
have made their detection already’). These participants also often incorporated their own 
personal beliefs or experiences in making these decisions of relevance (refer to Figure 
11). Twenty-one (68%) participants used this approach for at least one of the problems. 
Intuition-based Reasoning 
 The last group of participants often focused on one source of probability 
information and then subjectively adjusted it up or down depending on the other source 
of probability information. These participants often appeared to infer that the probability 
information is only given to simply help them interpret the story (e.g., dogs are accurate – 
90% is a good level of accuracy). A couple of participants did not even bother utilizing 
any of the probability information; preferring to rely on their own intuitive-judgments of 
what this probability should be. They sometimes related the problem to their own 
personal experiences without a need to incorporate any of the objective probability 
information provided in the problem description (refer to Figure 12). Thirteen 
participants (42%) used this very simple approach to determining their answers for at 
least one of the problems. 
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Discussion 
Since Kahneman and Tversky labeled base rate neglect as a cognitive bias in the 
1970s, the bias has been regarded as a strong and consistent phenomenon for decades. 
The definition of base rate neglect as ‘the neglecting of base rate information in favor of 
individuating information’ describes the phenomenon but does not help us understand 
why such a bias occurs. In addition, researchers who have investigated this bias have 
ignored the wide range of possible answers provided by participants that go beyond the 
one described in the previous definition. Base rate neglect answers are often not the most 
frequent answer provided by participants in previous research (refer to Figure 1), and 
some participants even show the opposite bias by relying solely on base rate information 
and neglected the individuating information (refer to Figure 6 for an example from the 
current study). 
The variability of answers provided across participants when solving these 
Bayesian reasoning problems is further compounded by the within-participant variability 
in answers when multiple problems are given to participants (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Byun & 
Ball, 2015; Cohen & Staub, 2015; McNair & Feeney, 2014, 2015). The base rate 
probability information and individuating probability information (hits and false alarms) 
are usually varied across problems in these research studies. The values given still satisfy 
the general experimental requirement of a low base rate probability for the primary 
outcome, [e.g., having cancer P(H)] in comparison to a much larger complementary 
probability for the alternative outcome [e.g., not having cancer P(H)]. The 
individuating information generally describes a relatively high hit rate for the second 
source of information [e.g., positive mammogram test result for women with cancer 
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P(D|H)] with a corresponding low false positive rate [e.g., positive mammogram test for 
women without cancer P(D|H)]. The event descriptions will usually change from one 
problem to the next (e.g., judging cancer likelihood, judging the success of a spam filter) 
and can reflect very different real world decision making contexts. Unfortunately, past 
research is unclear whether the different answers provided by participants across the 
different problems result from consistent or inconsistent use of the same decision making 
strategy (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Byun & Ball, 2015; Cohen & Staub, 2015; McNair & Feeney, 
2014, 2015).  
The current study revealed that both uses are possible. The same decision making 
strategy can produce considerable variability in the answers provided by a participant, 
while conversely different decision making strategies can produce very little variability in 
the answers provided by a participant. For example, one participant gave an answer of 
5% for the Sniffer Dog problem by calculating a value that fell between P(H) and P(D|H) 
(i.e., did not use base rate information for non-occurrence of H). However, the same 
participant used a different calculation strategy for the Spam E-mail problem [P(D|¬H)] 
(i.e., only used individuating information for non-occurrence of H) and obtained an 
answer of similar magnitude (10%). This participant used another different calculation 
for the Pregnancy Test problem [P(H)] (only used base rate information for occurrence of 
H) and again provided an answer of similar magnitude (5%). The answers provided by 
participants are not a reliable source for researchers to use when distinguishing 
participants’ decision making strategies. What researchers need to know is how 
participants actually came up with these answers. 
                        27 
The between- and within-participant variability in answers found in previous 
research has been explained by individual differences in numeracy and reasoning abilities 
(Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Lipkus & Peters, 2009; Frederick 2005). Byun and Ball 
(2015) also found that measures of these abilities did correlate weakly with participant 
performance at solving early steps of the Bayesian probability calculations. However, one 
would expect these relationships to get stronger as the numeracy and reasoning required 
for latter steps increased, however Byun and Ball did not find this to be the case (refer to 
Table 1). Their findings supplement the results of the current study and suggest a 
numeracy-reasoning explanation is not comprehensive enough to explain the between- 
and within-participant variability found in Bayesian reasoning responses. In addition, this 
explanation does not explain why some participants are more likely to subjectively 
interpret the story or relate the story description to their own personal experiences rather 
than use the objective probability information provided for each problem. 
A more comprehensive model for describing the different points where individual 
differences can result in complex Bayesian reasoning tasks is illustrated in Figure 13, and 
this model was developed from the verbal protocol analyses conducted in the current 
study. This model highlights the importance of distinguishing story interpretation effects 
from basic probability calculation mistakes. Consequently, this model goes beyond the 
simple numeracy-reasoning explanations provided by other researchers (Azjen, 1977; 
Bar-Hillel, 1980; Edwards, 1968; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Hammerton, 1973; 
Kaheman & Tversky, 1972, 1973; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007; Lyon & Slovic, 1976). 
The model depicted in Figure 13 also highlights the difficulties in using a ‘one-method-
fits-all’ prescriptive approach to help people perform better (more normative) Bayesian 
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reasoning and overcome the common base rate neglect bias (e.g., Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 
1995; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007; Siegrist & Keller, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1977, 1980). The current research suggests that a combination of these methods will 
work best, and that the methods selected need to be tailored for each participant. The 
focus of past research on conclusions based only on participants’ answers has resulted in 
researchers overlooking the different needs of different participants when performing 
complex Bayesian reasoning. 
There were some participants in the current study who relied solely on their own 
subjective interpretations of the event descriptions that were independent of the 
probability information provided. They either deemed this information to be irrelevant to 
the problem or just simply ignored it (see also Bar-Hillel, 1980). The most frequent and 
distinguishable reason for neglecting probability information was a faulty understanding 
of the spatial and/or temporal relationships between the base rate event and the 
individuating event. This neglect hides the important causal relationship connecting these 
two events. Some participants viewed the base rate information as involving other people 
in different situations from the past, and therefore not relevant to what is happening now 
and described by the individuating information. For example, some participants stated 
that the fact other people have hidden drugs in their suitcase in the past is irrelevant to 
what their friend is going through now. But this is obviously illogical reasoning, because 
past statistics often predict future event outcomes. For example, intersections that have a 
history of accidents are probably dangerous intersections – why would you ignore the 
historical data when you are driving through this intersection? Other participants viewed 
the probability information as simply probability-based metaphors for the verbal 
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statements describing the event. Just like common probability metaphors in the English 
language like “one in a million” is another way of saying an event occurrence is rare or 
unlikely, and the statement “fifty fifty” suggests that two outcomes have roughly an equal 
probability of occurrence. One participant even relied on these subjective interpretations 
even though this participant showed in their last problem calculations that they possess 
the probability training to perform the normative Bayesian computations. One possible 
way of helping individuals to see the benefits of objective probability information is to 
provide them with indicators of the causal relationships between these sources of 
probability information and the final decision outcome. This was first suggested by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1977, 1980), and later shown by Krynski and Tenenbaum 
(2007) to help some participants make better Bayesian judgments. Although, this causal 
facilitation effect may only result for highly numerate participants (McNair & Feeney, 
2015). 
 Other participants showed a difficulty translating verbal descriptions into 
probability formulae needed for each step of the probability calculations. Previous 
research suggests that providing the probability information in terms of natural 
frequencies can help participants overcome these difficulties. For example, saying one 
women out of 100 women can have cancer while 99 of these women don’t have cancer, is 
easier for participants to understand than saying there is a one percent chance of having 
cancer in this population (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). Researchers have also found 
performance benefits after they provide participants with a visual representation of the 
solution (e.g., tree-diagram) (Beitzel & Staley, 2015; Sirota, Kostovičová, & Vallée-
Tourangeau, 2015). These researchers taught participants to perform Bayesian probability 
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calculations by providing them with these visual aids, and the researchers found these 
improvements to persist over time. Likewise, providing tools (pencil and paper and sets 
of cards matching the quantities stated in a Bayesian problem) to participants to help 
solve these problems can increase participant interactivity when solving Bayesian 
problems that results in improved performance (Vallée-Tourangeau, Abadie, & Vallée-
Tourangeau, 2015). Future research could involve a verbal protocol analysis of each 
participant’s initial attempt to solve one Bayesian problem, and then tailor an intervention 
training strategy based on the model depicted in Figure 13 to help this participant. This 
identification-multi-method approach could be tested against the typical ‘one-method-
fits-all’ approach offered in past research (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Krynski & 
Tenenbaum, 2007; Siegrist & Keller, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1977, 1980). 
 The conclusions of the current research were based on retrospective verbal 
protocols and this methodology has been criticized in the past for not being completely 
objective when analyzing an individual’s though processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
The participant may not be able to provide a verbal description of their thought processes, 
or alternatively, they may provide verbal descriptions that they feel match the demand 
characteristics of the experiment, especially when answering direct questions about the 
use of specific sources of probability information in the current study. A future study 
could utilize eye-movement recording to examine what problem information is being 
examined by the participant and how well this data corresponds with the verbal protocols 
collected. We would predict that when participants rely for the most part on the story 
description for their answers, their corresponding eye-movements will show very few 
fixations on numerical probability values. Likewise when participants stop their 
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calculation steps too early in the problem solving sequence, we would expect less eye-
movement regressions to include prior probability calculations in these later steps.  
 Base rate neglect is a catchy term for a cognitive bias that can result during 
Bayesian reasoning, but it has limited the focus of past research to only examining why 
base rate neglect can occur. However, base rate neglect is simply one of many ways that 
participants can fail to conduct the normative steps required for solving Bayesian 
reasoning problems. The current thesis does not limit itself in this way, and this has 
resulted in a much more comprehensive model of the different ways that faulty Bayesian 
reasoning can occur. Our model also highlights that prescriptive procedures for 
overcoming these faults needs to be tailored to each individual and may require more 
than one method to resolve their difficulties.  
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Table 1 
Bayesian computations, success rates, and correlations with numeracy and cognitive 
reasoning measures found by Byun and Ball (2015) 
  
Calculation 
Correct 
answer 
% of 
Correct 
# of 
Answer 
Performance 
of Numeracy 
Scale 
Performance 
of 
2-item CRT 
 
P(H) 15% 98.2% 2 .02 -.08 
 
P(¬H) 85% 98.2% 2 .02 -.08 
 
P(d|H) 80% 92.7% 5 .26** .31** 
 
P(d|¬H) 20% 92.7% 5 .17 .27*** 
 
P(H) × P(d|H) 12% 60.2% 23 .32* .24* 
 
P(¬H) × P(d|¬H) 17% 59.3% 20 .49*** .41*** 
 
P(H) × P(d|H) + P(¬H) 
× P(d|¬H) 29% 31.5% 23 .35*** .33** 
 
P(H|d) 
 
41.38% 3.6% 25 .14 .16 
* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001. 
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Figure 1. Total percentage of “other or non-explained” responses that resulted for four 
past studies that examined base rate neglect. 
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Figure 2. Frequency distribution of answers for a sample of three problems used by Byun 
and Ball (2015). Left line indicates base rate probability P(H), middle line indicates 
correct Bayesian answer P(H|D), and right line indicates hit rate probability P(D|H). 
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Figure 3. Examples of participant responses that highlight consistent probability (i.e., 
smallest inconsistency measure values) based responses (top and center panels) and 
inconsistent response patterns (bottom panel) (i.e., highest inconsistency measures).  
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Figure 4. Instructions for each of the three Bayesian problems. 
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Participant: Um, this one was harder to think about because it kind of depends on the 
friend. Because I was just thinking about how to make it real life relatable, so I guess 
the 2% of luggage that contains drugs is a really small probability so that I wouldn’t 
think that my friend had drugs, but if the dog smelled the drugs I would probably be a 
little skeptical, because dogs are right, like I mean sniffer dogs are right 90% of the 
time, which is really a lot. And, um, yeah, that’s all. Well it’s weird how they’re right 
90% of the time and not right 20% of the time, because that’s more than 100 but, so I 
guess that makes it a little less reliable.  
Experimenter: So, you said your answer was 70%. How did you come up with 70% as 
the answer? 
Participant: I just subtracted 90 and 20 because those seemed like the most relevant 
numbers, 90% right and 20% wrong so a 70% chance. (Respondent #7) 
 
 
 
Figure 5. A sample transcript of verbal protocol. Transcripts are segmented 
(underlined) and then coded using the template provided below for each problem. 
Calculation processes are depicted on the right side of the coding template and non-
calculation processes (e.g., subjective interpretation of value or situation) are depicted 
on the left side of the coding template. 
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Figure 6. Frequency distribution of answers for three problems used in the current study. 
Left line indicates base rate probability P(H), middle line indicates correct Bayesian 
answer P(H|D), and right line indicates hit rate probability P(D|H). 
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Figure 7. A coded example of a correct Bayesian reasoning strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        40 
 
 
Figure 8.  A coded example of an incorrect probability-based reasoning strategy where 
all the necessary information is utilized, but not correctly. This participant did not add 
P(H) + P(H|D) to the denominator for the last step of the Bayesian probability 
calculation. 
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Figure 9. A coded example of a participant who reduced the four outcomes of the two 
combined events to just two outcomes. The participant stops at the conditional 
probability calculation as a result of this misperception. 
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Figure 10. A coded example of a participant who uses some of the probability 
information, but not all of the information required to provide the correct answer.  
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Figure 11. A coded example of a strategy involving two sources of information based 
on personal intuitive judgments.  
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Figure 12. A coded example of the intuition-based reasoning approach. This participant 
made their final judgment after subjective interpretation of the story and reflecting on 
their own personal experiences.  
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Figure 13. A descriptive model of how different Bayesian reasoning answers occur. Each 
stage contribute to the unique variability of answers and individuals need different help to 
facilitate their Bayesian decision making. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        46 
References 
Ajzen, I. (1977). Intuitive theories of events and the effects of base-rate information on 
 prediction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35(5), 303–314. 
 http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.35.5.303 
Ayal, S., & Beyth-Marom, R. (2014). The effects of mental steps and compatibility on 
 Bayesian reasoning. Judgment and Decision Making, 9(3), 226. 
Ball, C. T., Langholtz, H. J., Auble, J., & Sopchak, B. (1998). Resource-Allocation 
 Strategies: A Verbal Protocol Analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human 
 Decision Processes, 76(1), 70–88. http://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1998.2798 
Bar-Hillel, M. (1980). The base-rate fallacy in probability judgments. Acta Psychologica, 
 44(3), 211–233. http://doi.org/10.1016/0001-6918(80)90046-3 
Beitzel, B. D., & Staley, R. K. (2015). The efficacy of using diagrams when solving 
 probability word problems in college. The Journal of Experimental Education, 
 83(1), 130-145. 
Byun, K., & Ball, C. T. (2015, November). Lost in Translation: There is more to Base 
 Rate Neglect than Neglect. Poster session presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
 Society for Judgment and Decision Making, Chicago, IL. 
Cohen, A. L., & Staub, A. (2015). Within-subject consistency and between-subject 
 variability in Bayesian reasoning strategies. Cognitive Psychology, 81, 26–47. 
 http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.08.001 
Edwards, W. (1968). Conservatism in human information processing. In B. Kleinmuntz 
 (Ed.), Formal representation of human judgment. New York: Wiley, 1968, 17-52. 
                        47 
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making. The Journal of 
 Economic Perspectives, 19(4), 25–42. 
Gigerenzer, G. (1996). The Psychology of Good Judgment Frequency Formats and 
 Simple Algorithms. Medical Decision Making, 16(3), 273–280.
 http://doi.org/10.1177/0272989X9601600312 
Gigerenzer, G., & Hoffrage, U. (1995). How to improve Bayesian reasoning without 
 instruction: Frequency formats. Psychological Review, 102(4), 684–704. 
 http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.102.4.684 
Hammerton, M. (1973). A case of radical probability estimation. Journal of Experimental 
 Psychology, 101(2), 252–254. http://doi.org/10.1037/h0035224 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972). Subjective probability: A judgment of 
 representativeness. Cognitive Psychology, 3(3), 430–454. 
 http://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(72)90016-3 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological 
 Review, 80(4), 237–251. http://doi.org/10.1037/h0034747 
Krynski, T. R., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2007). The role of causality in judgment under 
 uncertainty. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 136(3), 430–450. 
 http://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.136.3.430 
Lipkus, I. M., & Peters, E. (2009). Understanding the Role of Numeracy in Health: 
 Proposed Theoretical Framework and Practical Insights. Health Education & 
 Behavior, 36(6), 1065–1081. http://doi.org/10.1177/1090198109341533 
Lipkus, I. M., Samsa, G., & Rimer, B. K. (2001). General performance on a numeracy 
 scale among highly educated samples. Medical Decision Making, 21(1), 37-44. 
                        48 
Lewis, C., & Keren, G. (1999). On the difficulties underlying Bayesian reasoning: a 
 comment on Gigerenzer and Hoffrage. Psychological Review, 106(2), 411-416. 
Lyon, D., & Slovic, P. (1976). Dominance of accuracy information and neglect of base 
 rates in probability estimation. Acta Psychologica, 40(4), 287–298. 
 http://doi.org/10.1016/0001-6918(76)90032-9 
McNair, S., & Feeney, A. (2014). When does information about causal structure improve 
 statistical reasoning? The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 67(4), 
 625–645. http://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2013.821709 
McNair, S., & Feeney, A. (2015). Whose statistical reasoning is facilitated by a causal 
 structure intervention? Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 22(1), 258-264. 
Meehl, P. E., & Rosen, A. (1955). Antecedent probability and the efficiency of 
 psychometric signs, patterns, or cutting scores. Psychological Bulletin, 52(3), 
 194–216. http://doi.org/10.1037/h0048070 
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports 
 on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231–259. 
 http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.84.3.231 
Obrecht, N. A., Chapman, G. B., & Gelman, R. (2007). Intuitive t tests: Lay use of 
 statistical information. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14(6), 1147-1152. 
Siegrist, M., & Keller, C. (2011). Natural frequencies and Bayesian reasoning: the impact 
 of formal education and problem context. Journal of Risk Research, 14(9), 1039
 -1055. 
Simon, H. A. (1956). Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychological 
 review, 63(2), 129-138. 
                        49 
Sirota, M., Kostovičová, L., & Vallée-Tourangeau, F. (2015). How to train your 
 Bayesian: a problem-representation transfer rather than a format-representation 
 shift explains training effects. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
 68(1), 1-9. 
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2011). The Cognitive Reflection Test as 
 a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks. Memory & Cognition, 
 39(7), 1275–1289. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1977). Causal Schemata in Judgments under Uncertainty. 
 Decisions and Designs, McLean, Virginia. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1980). Causal schemas in judgment under uncertainty. In 
 M. Fishbein (ed.), Progress in social psychology. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982). Evidential impact of base rates. In D. Kahneman, 
 P. Slovic & A. Tversky (eds), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases 
 (pp. 153-163). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Vallée-Tourangeau, G., Abadie, M., & Vallée-Tourangeau, F. (2015). Interactivity fosters 
 Bayesian reasoning without instruction. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
 General, 144(3), 581-603. 
 
